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Abstract. While security has become important in embedded systems,
commodity operating systems often fail in effectively separating pro-
cesses, mainly due to a too large trusted computing base. System vir-
tualization can establish isolation already with a small code base, but
many existing embedded CPU architectures have very limited virtual-
ization hardware support, so that the performance impact is often non-
negligible. Targeting both security and performance, we investigate an
approach in which a few minor hardware additions together with virtual-
ization offer protected execution in embedded systems while still allowing
non-virtualized execution when secure services are not needed. Bench-
marks of a prototype implementation on an emulated ARM Cortex A8
platform confirm that switching between those two execution forms can
be done efficiently.
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1 Introduction
Embedded systems are becoming more powerful, distributed and globally con-
nected. We see a transition from classical single function embedded systems to
powerful collaborative special purpose computing devices often controlling sen-
sitive or critical infrastructure functions, so called cyber-physical systems. In the
past, software attacks were mainly targeting high performance computers such
as desktop computers, laptops, and recently also mobile devices. This is about
to change rapidly. Security threats against cyber-physical systems have become
a severe issue, requiring strong platform security protection techniques such as
separation [26] without overly increasing performance or system costs.
The need for separation of security critical data and code on mobile de-
vices motivated ARM to introduce the TrustZone technology [4], available for
some (but not all) ARM systems. TrustZone is a System-on-Chip (SoC) isolation
technique that establishes a high degree of separation between trusted and non-
trusted execution, while keeping context switches fast. To distinguish between
trusted and non-trusted address space, TrustZone adds an additional address bit
to the bus system. In order to not break isolation, careful SoC adaptations at
the design level of application specific integrated circuits (ASIC) are necessary
to make memory interfaces, interrupt controllers, Direct Memory Access (DMA)
devices etc. aware of that bit.
System virtualization is an alternative way to protect security critical assets
[15,16]. However, in tiny embedded systems with limited hardware virtualization
support, system virtualization implies a non-negligible performance overhead
[12]. On the other hand, security services typically do not run on the system all
the time. They can be scheduled on a regular basis to perform monitoring or be
called upon demand (e.g., for secret key operations).
In this paper we propose an alternative system virtualization enabled ap-
proach for separation, based on dual mode execution, i.e., the ability of choosing
between virtualized and non-virtualized execution mode, and switching between
the modes through soft reboots. The goal of the solution is to provide separa-
tion while keeping both performance overhead and required SoC adaptations to
a minimum. Only a few hardware adaptations to an existing architecture are
required. In one of the typical use cases, a service for proving the device’s iden-
tity to its environment wants to keep the authentication key secret from the
rest of the system. The system would run non-virtualized in the majority of the
time, but activate the trusted service domain only for the actual authentication
process. The exchange of required challenge-response-messages throughout that
process will happen via remote procedure calls (RPCs).
Different from general purpose hypervisors (also called virtual machine mon-
itors (VMM)) such as Xen [19] and KVM for ARM [12], a hypervisor with the
purpose of separation or monitoring has a more focused scope and several opti-
mizations can be made. We have developed a tiny hypervisor for ARM Cortex
A8 with focus on separation. It was recently released as open source, and isola-
tion properties of one version of this hypervisor have been formally verified on
binary level. Based on this hypervisor, FreeRTOS as main guest, and emulated
ARM Cortex A8 hardware enriched by our hardware extensions, we have imple-
mented the suggested approach for dual mode protected execution. Benchmark
figures show the feasibility of the concept. The main costs for enabling isolated
services consists of their decryption and the integrity check of those services and
of the lightweight hypervisor. Returning to non-virtualized execution does not
take much longer than the erasure of newly produced confidential data.
Contrary to other approaches, that are for example based on TrustZone or
trusted computing enabled late launch [17], the solution presented in this paper
does not require any particular CPU architecture or extensions to the CPU,
which keeps costs low and makes the concept applicable to a large set of embed-
ded systems. Summarized, our solution offers the following benefits:
1. Trusted domains can be executed with guaranteed separation without caus-
ing performance overhead in phases where their services are not required.
2. If desired and the use case allows the resulting latency, the commodity OS
can be paused throughout the protected phase, so that trusted domains can
execute without the need of paravirtualization1 of the commodity OS.2
3. The proposed protocol includes a secure boot scheme, so that confidentiality
and integrity of hypervisor and trusted domains are maintained even in the
presence of external accesses to their non-volatile storage.
2 Hardware and Protocol
We consider a concept that relies on minor adaptations on SoC design level to
make it possible to run the system in two modes, protected mode and normal
mode. In protected mode a dedicated hypervisor runs in the most privileged level
on each CPU in the system and trusted guests (such as secret key services) can
run separated by the commodity OS, while in normal mode no hypervisor needs
to be present in the system, as depicted in Figure 1 for a single CPU system.3
Priviliged software can cause transitions between modes by requesting a soft
reboot (also referred to as soft reset or warm reboot), which is initiated by the
system’s reset signal.
The SoC contains two special purpose volatile memory registers: a mode state
register and a transition register. The mode state register states whether the
system is currently in protected or normal mode. The transition register is used
to state the intention of commodity OS or hypervisor about which mode to enter.
The mode state register can only be changed in early booting phases. Thereafter
it will be locked through a sticky bit so that it can not be modified anymore until
a chip reset (and consequently a soft reboot) occurs. The boot code responsible
for the hypervisor and OS kernel launch determines which mode to boot into -
and consequently the value to set in the mode state register. In a cold boot (full
hardware reset) the default mode value is given by a boot configuration. In a
warm/soft reboot the value is determined by the transition register, as set by
the higher level software.
When running in protected mode, the hypervisor controls sensitive appli-
cations, I/O devices and data and can protect the system from illegal access
1 Paravirtualization [28, p. 422] describes any modification of guest operating sys-
tems, in order to enable their execution on a virtualized environment instead of bare
metal, e.g. by making them use software interrupts (hypercalls) to perform privileged
operations, according to the hypervisor’s API.
2 Depending on the scenario, interrupts would be recorded by the hypervisor or just
masked during the pause.
3 Here, we illustrate a single CPU architecture, but the principle can easily be extended
to a multicore architecture, see Section 2.1.
Fig. 1. Dual mode operation.
to these units. This can be achieved using the normal Memory Management
Unit (MMU) or Memory Protection Unit (MPU) present in most systems. If
applicable, additional hardware protection support can be utilized, such as an
Input/Output MMU (IOMMU). The memory protection mechanisms are also
used to make sure that, when running in protected mode, a soft reboot to normal
mode can only be initiated by the hypervisor or hypervisor protected units, such
as a watch dog timer reset function (placed in a protected address space). 4
Figure 2 shows a SoC design according to the approach and the proof of
concept implementation we have done using emulated hardware (see Section 5).
In addition to the two special purpose registers, the SoC design includes one or
several chip unique secret key(s), stored in non-volatile registers. They are used
to decrypt and check the integrity of security critical code/data that is loaded
into the chip internal or external RAM. To prevent any usage of the chip unique
secrets in normal mode, they are tied to the mode state register and locked
to protected mode. In our proof of concept implementation we have optimized
performance with a fully functional cryptographic module, the transition crypto
module. However, cryptographic operations can be performed in software as well,
reducing the number of changes to integrated circuits, but at the prize of an
increased performance overhead. If not mentioned otherwise, we assume the
presence of a transition crypto module in the remainder of the paper.
In order to show how these SoC components are used in the suggested ap-
proach, below we describe the details of the cold boot, the transition from pro-
tected to normal mode and the transition from normal to protected mode.
4 As discussed in Section 5.2, unprivileged software can at most achieve a soft reboot
to protected mode or a cold reboot.
Fig. 2. SoC system view.
Cold Boot The following steps are performed in a cold boot:
1. After the machine is powered on, a first stage boot code is executed. To
prevent security from being compromised, this code needs to be protected
from modifications by storing it in write-protected memory such as on-chip-
ROM.
2. The first stage boot code loads the integrity protected second stage boot code
and boot configurations into on-chip-RAM. The second stage boot code and
its configurations are protected with signatures verifiable with a public key
stored in write-protected memory, such as ROM, or hardware registers, such
as e-fuse registers.
3. The first stage boot code reads the verified boot configurations and writes
the default boot mode (normal or protected) into the mode state register,
which is then locked.
4. The first stage boot code launches the second stage boot code. Depending
on the system and use case, one or several intermediate boot stages are
processed until the boot code responsible for hypervisor or operating system
launch is reached. We call this boot stage transition boot stage.
5. The transition boot stage reads the current value of the mode state register.
If the register indicates normal mode, the operating system indicated in the
boot configurations is launched. If the register indicates protected mode, the
following steps are performed:
(a) The transition boot code loads hypervisor, trusted guest(s) and data
from external memory and verifies the integrity (e.g., by using a tran-
sition crypto module). The confidentiality of trusted guests is protected
through fast symmetric encryption with a chip unique secret key. If re-
quired, confidentiality protection can also be applied to the hypervisor
or parts thereof.
(b) If decryption and integrity verification in the previous step were success-
ful, the transition boot code hands over the execution to the hypervisor.
Otherwise, the transition boot stage code clears all security sensitive
data on the system, writes “normal mode” into the transition register
and issues a soft reset, so that the system reboots into normal mode.
This allows the system to recover even if it could not be started into
protected mode.
Transition from Protected to Normal Mode When the system is in protected
mode and secure services are no longer needed on the system, the hypervisor
switches the system back to normal mode, as follows:
1. All trusted guests currently running are halted by the hypervisor. If re-
quired, persistent data is stored, integrity and confidentiality protected. Sub-
sequently, the memory of trusted guests is cleared.
2. All confidential hypervisor data is cleared from memory.
3. The hypervisor can choose to maintain non-confidential code/data in mem-
ory to avoid reloading and reinitializing when returning to protected mode.
In that case, Message Authentication Codes (MACs) protecting the integrity
are recomputed, given that the concerned memory regions have changed.
4. The hypervisor sets the transition register to “normal” and issues a SoC-
wide (soft) reset signal. This can be done via the component containing
the two special purpose registers. The resulting soft reboot of the system
will keep the content of most volatile memories, which allows a rather quick
booting process without the need to reload all code and data from non-
volatile memories.
At reset, the system will be booted into normal mode (analogous to the previous
paragraph) running the OS kernel in the most privileged CPU mode as “usual”,
i.e., as in a non-virtualized system (see Figure 1). Before handing over execution
to the commodity OS, the boot code clears all registers to avoid that confidential
data from a protected mode phase is leaked into normal mode.
Transition from Normal to Protected Mode When the system is in normal mode
and one or several security critical services are required, the commodity oper-
ating system writes “protected” into the transition register and issues a soft
reset signal. It can inform the hypervisor about requested services and their
parameters by writing service request values into dedicated transition memory
before the reset. Subsequently, the boot is performed in analogy to the cold boot
into protected mode, retrieving mode information from the transition register.
However, the commodity OS is not loaded again and, if chosen so, the non-
confidential parts of the hypervisor (such as code, page tables, constants) are
not either. In contrast to that, integrity verification is always performed, possi-
bly even for new memory regions used by, for example, page tables created in
the previous hypervisor session. If hypervisor memory has been compromised in
normal mode or protected mode has not been active before, a fallback option will
(re-)load the entire hypervisor from the storage as done in cold boot. Once the
system is rebooted, the hypervisor will check the requested secure service(s) by
reading the transition memory and launch them with the given parameters after
checking that both services and parameters are valid and sound. Alternatively,
this information can be passed via a hypercall from the commodity OS, once it
is invoked by the hypervisor.
On a mode transition in either direction the commodity OS is usually aware
of the upcoming soft reboot and will pause active processes as well as store their
contexts before releasing control. Those processes (kept in memory) can then
easily be resumed in the new mode. Before the hypervisor or OS reconfigures
the peripherals, it needs to check whether interrupts (masked throughout the
soft reboot) have occurred. Depending on the use case, the boot code can also
be used to record events in a queue. In typical scenarios, the user will be aware
of the inherent latency.
2.1 Implementation Alternatives
Enforced Protected Mode through Watch Dog Timer An alternative realization
of the presented approach connects the watch dog timer of the SoC to the mode
state register, so that the timer can only be reset if the system is in protected
mode. If not kept alive, the watch dog issues a soft reset. At soft reset, the
transition boot stage code checks the status of the watch dog timer and if it has
reached zero, the transition boot code will boot the system into protected mode,
independently of the transition register. This forces the system into protected
mode in some pre-defined time intervals, which can be useful for monitoring or
to counteract denial of other trusted services.
Soft Reboot Enabled by TrustZone The ARM TrustZone technology for ARM11
and ARM Cortex embedded processors [4] offers support for creating two se-
curely isolated virtual cores (or worlds as they are termed) on a single real core.
Both secure world and normal world manage an own virtual MMU, as well as
an own vector table and thus own exception handlers [13]. System hardware, in-
cluding memory and peripherals, can be allotted to each world. This is realized
by an additional address bit. However, that separation requires that peripheral
devices are adapted to the setting. A transition between the worlds is initiated
by a hardware interrupt or a Secure Mode Call (SMC), both invoking the so
called monitor mode, which is responsible for context switches. The concept of
turning a hypervisor on and off on demand, as described in this paper, can also
be implemented based on TrustZone instead of the discussed hardware exten-
sions. Bootloader, hypervisor, trusted guest and the current mode would then
be kept stored in the memory of the secure world, which only executes code to
realize the soft reboot transitions. The execution of all other software (including
the hypervisor and the trusted guest) happens in the normal world. Soft resets
would be realized through SMCs. One of the advantages of this variant is that
no soft reboot specific hardware extension in form of, e.g., a mode state regis-
ter is required, something which is especially useful when TrustZone is already
present anyway. Furthermore, keeping assets in the secure world reduces the need
for crypto operations considerably. However, a secure boot scheme would still be
needed to ensure that the hypervisor and the trusted guest(s) are loaded into the
secure world memory confidentially and integrity protected. Hardware protected
keys are therefore still required. Moreover, peripherals have to be adapted in or-
der to maintain separation between the two worlds. This limitation together with
the costs of the TrustZone extension makes a TrustZone driven implementation
variant only preferable to the standard one if the soft reboot is to be enabled on
an already existing system that (including its peripherals) supports TrustZone
from the beginning.
Multicore Systems The presented solution is also applicable to multicore systems.
Since the mode state is a global property to control access to the chip unique
keys, all CPUs have to agree on the mode. Consequently, when in protected
mode, all CPUs need to be protected by a hypervisor, irrespectively if they are
running secure services or not. There would be some master hypervisor on the
system, which has the responsibility to coordinate, to execute trusted services
and to issue soft reboots. In order to switch from protected to normal mode,
the master hypervisor would inform its neighbors and wait until it has received
acknowledgments from all of them before issuing the actual reset signal. Likewise,
when booting into protected mode, the master hypervisor will be booted first
on the main CPU and then launch all other hypervisors.
3 Hypervisor
A prototype implementation for the described solution has been established on
the basis of a type-1 hypervisor5, available as open source from [27]. Its focus lies
on providing security by MMU-supported separation and its isolation properties
have been formally verified on binary level [11]. Following the system virtualiza-
tion principle, it allows the parallel execution of multiple paravirtualized guests
in user mode. Both Linux and FreeRTOS have been ported to the hypervisor.
Isolation between guests can intentionally be relaxed by the possibility to com-
municate with well-defined and parameterizable RPCs via the hypervisor. In
addition to inter-guest-separation, the hypervisor offers introspection features
such as virtual guest modes that enable intra-guest-separation as well, for ex-
ample in order to maintain the guest OS’ kernel separation even when executing
in the processor’s non-privileged operation mode. The implementation of the
hypervisor comprises 2717 lines of C code and 942 lines of assembly, result-
ing in a compiled binary of 31 KB. The hypervisor was developed for single-core
ARMv5 and ARMv7 architectures and deployed on Beaglebone [9], Beagleboard
[7], Beagleboard-xM [8], NovaThor [29] and the Integrator development board
[3], as well as on emulated platforms within the OVP framework [24].
5 Hypervisors of type 1, also called native hypervisors, are not running on any host
OS, but on bare metal.
4 Software Adaptions
We have implemented a single-core prototype of the solution, based on FreeR-
TOS as commodity OS and the inhouse hypervisor for ARMv7 described in
Section 3. Both FreeRTOS and the hypervisor had to be modified to support
the soft reboot functionality, as described in this section. The trusted domain
was easily implemented since it only needs to offer an entry point for receiving
RPCs and the awareness about the RPC parameter passing protocol. Three dif-
ferent interrupt vector tables were configured and are mapped according to the
mode; while the vector of the boot code is only referred to on reset, the hypervi-
sor vector is active in protected mode and FreeRTOS’ vector is either referred to
directly (in normal mode) or used to receive control from the hypervisor. Oth-
erwise, memory mapping is static and access rights only change in dependency
to the current mode. Binaries are linked/built separately for each entity and,
where required, encrypted and/or integrity protected before deployment.
Adaptations to the Commodity OS The core adaptation in the commodity OS
consists of changes that enables it to run both as guest on top of the hypervisor
and natively on bare metal with control over the privileged operation ring of the
CPU. While in the latter setting, privileged operations are performed directly
by the corresponding privileged instructions, hypercalls have to be used in the
first setting. We added a dual API layer that selects the required implementation
for each functionality in dependency of a mode indicating configuration bit set
by the bootloader. Similarly, FreeRTOS was made able to switch between its
own kernel separation enforcement and the kernel protection provided by the
hypervisor. On startup, the commodity OS either performs its own hardware
configurations or it registers itself to the hypervisor, before creating or resuming
processes. Finally, we inserted code that makes use of the RPC functionality to
communicate with a trusted domain and that actually initiates soft reboots for
demonstration and benchmark purposes.
Adaptations to the Hypervisor The adaptations to the hypervisor were quite lim-
ited. Essentially, besides providing configuration information about commodity
OS and trusted guest, only a hypercall needed to be added, that realizes the
initiation of a soft reboot into normal mode, including the optional write back
of the trusted domain and the erasure of all confidential data. The hypervisor
makes use of the possibility to be partly kept in memory on soft reboot. In
particular, this applies to the sections for code and constants, that both do not
change throughout the system’s uptime, and the page tables, for which a new
MAC is computed after they are generated. Data section, BSS section, heap and
stack are treated confidential and cleared before soft reboot. The data section is
the only part that needs to be reloaded when coming back to protected mode,
given that no memory corruptions have occurred in normal mode. Whether the
hypervisor memory is still uncorrupted or had to be reloaded by the bootloader
is indicated as argument to the hypervisor, so that page tables can be recom-
puted if necessary. Note that we migrated the responsibility of loading guests
from the hypervisor to the bootloader. Similarly, we decided to invoke trusted
services via RPCs by the commodity OS after a soft reboot to protected mode
instead of passing parameters about the desired service to the hypervisor. In
that way, no decisions are required by the hypervisor upon boot, but control can
simply be transfered to the guest’s entry point directly.
Bootloader The implementation of the bootloader was carried out in a straight
forward manner according to the protocol in Section 2, using a transition crypto
module for cryptographic operations. In our implementation the bootloader is
divided into two stages. The first stage boot code checks the transition register,
loads and verifies the second stage boot code and is placed into ROM along
with its vector table. The second stage boot code loads the commodity OS, the
hypervisor and the trusted guest (depending on the mode), carries out needed
verification steps and finally calls the commodity OS or hypervisor.
5 Evaluation
The approach can be implemented on many current embedded architectures with
minor hardware changes (a few special purpose registers and hardware protected
keys), as most of the functionality relies on existing hardware features and func-
tions implemented in software, mainly the boot code and the hypervisor. To
demonstrate our solution and in order to obtain benchmarks on its performance,
we have implemented the described hardware extensions within the emulation
framework OVP [24]. It allows to implement and simulate the behavior of new
SoC hardware components with reasonable effort. The additional registers are
realized as memory mapped device connected to a SoC (emulation) with an in-
tegratorCP platform that includes a single ARM Cortex-A8 CPU. The register
extension has been wired to perform system resets when required. Furthermore,
a dedicated transition crypto module has been modelled in OVP, allowing us
to verify the required encryption/decryption and integrity check tasks. As OVP
can not provide exact simulation times, especially with respect to peripherals,
MMU and caches, the main purpose has been to test the concept as such and get
a good picture of the performance one can expect. Hence, the transition crypto
module is simplified with respect to its hardware interface and we allow direct
memory read from the transition crypto module over the bus. This allows us to
test the different boot cases and the concept, but not to simulate real transition
crypto module data transfers from the CPU or via DMA. We believe those sim-
plifications are reasonable since exact time estimates for these access forms can
not be obtained in an emulation environment such as OVP anyway.
5.1 Performance
The suggested approach allows running secure services isolated by a hypervisor
layer only when needed instead of permanently. Consequently, the secure services
can be implemented with a very small performance impact. This comes at the
price of soft resets when the secure services are needed. The objective of our
benchmarks is thus to estimate the overall costs for a soft reboot.
The evaluation includes three factors:
– the number of bytes copied (or erased) between/from storage devices (NAND
flash, RAM),
– the number of bytes fed into the transition crypto module for en-/decryption
or integrity value calculation and integrity checks,
– the number of remaining CPU instructions not involved in any such feeding,
copying or clearing operations.
These figures together allow us to estimate the overall time for all steps of the
suggested approach, making the following assumptions about the platform:
– The CPU is clocked with 720 MHz and nominally executes 200 MIPS, as
typical on many Cortex A8 development boards such as BeagleBoard [7].
– We assume a rather conservative RAM copy speed of 150 MB/second, which
is a lower estimate from [5].
– The copy speed from NAND flash to RAM is estimated by 6 MB/second
[21].
– We assume a transition crypto module supporting SHA-256 HMAC gener-
ation and AES-128 en-/decryption with a fair trade off between size and
speed, clocked at 174 MHz and with the ability to perform parallel hash-
ing/encryption or hashing/decryption with the speed of 171 MB/second.
Since hashing is the dominating work load in such parallelized operations,
the feasibility of such a speed can be concluded from, e.g., [10].
Table 1 provides an overview of the results for the single steps required,
depending on which transition is been considered. We distinguish between a cold
boot into protected mode (cp), a cold boot into normal mode (cn), a (warm/soft)
reboot into protected mode (wp) and a (warm/soft) reboot into normal mode
(wn). Crosses (X) indicate which step is involved in which transition. A dash (-)
indicates that the step in question is optional or does only occur in the first of
typically many soft reboots.
The benchmarks are based on a second stage boot code of 2.9 KB, FreeRTOS
as commodity operating system with a binary blob of 1 MB, the hypervisor
sections for code and constants, together 30 KB, hypervisor data of 1 KB and
a trusted domain of 380 KB. Those specifications refer to the initial volumes.
However, we allow the trusted domain to grow up to 1 MB for the usage of
stacks, data structures etc. The space reserved for the hypervisor’s heap, stack
and BSS section is 900 KB, while page table memory can be up to 64 KB.
A complete soft reboot cycle including two mode switches is with 19 mil-
liseconds estimated considerably faster than any cold boot, irrespectively of the
targeted mode. Avoiding slow accesses to external storage is responsible for the
main share of those performance benefits. However, also the number of boot
instructions is reduced in warm reboot, in respect to both the hypervisor and
the commodity OS. In both cases this optimization is mainly due to the dis-
pensed page table reconfiguration. Preconfigured page tables could reduce the
Table 1. Execution Costs per Step
step cp cn wp wn Bytes crypto other estimated
accessed module instr. time
in storage load in B in ms
configure registers and mode X X X X 29 0.0001
clean registers X 41 0.0002
load + verify 2nd stage code X X X X 2,987 2,987 26 0.4916
load FreeRTOS X X 1,043,288 19 165.8263
load + verify hypervisor code X 30,500 30,500 24 5.0181
verify hypervisor code X 30,500 22 0.1940
load + verify hypervisor data X X 960 960 22 0.1581
verify hypervisor page tables X 65,536 21 0.4168
copy encrypted trusted guest X 389,732 0 61.9562
decrypt + verify trusted guest X X 389,732 24 4.9558
boot hypervisor X 247,940 1.2397
reboot hypervisor X 27,707 0.1385
boot FreeRTOS, normal mode X 9,146 0.0457
reboot FreeRTOS, normal mode X 140 0.0007
(re-)boot FreeRTOS, protected X X 305 0.0015
compute page table MAC - 65,536 129 0.4173
(write back trusted guest) - 1,048,576 216 13.3341
erase confidential memory X 1,964,252 98 12.4889
initiate reset to protected mode X 41 0.0002
cold boot, protected mode X 248,389 239.6374
cold boot, normal mode X 9,220 166.3637
warm reboot, protected mode X 28,197 6.3566
warm reboot, normal mode X 334 12.9815
hypervisor’s booting phase also in a cold boot, but that would come at the costs
of an increased foot print and less flexibility. Since we allow the trusted guest
to grow to a size of up to 1 MB, writing it back (including MAC computation
and encryption) is comparatively expensive, and so is its deletion. In order to
optimize write back and clearing, one would need to narrow down the space
actually claimed by the trusted guest. However, writing the trusted guest back
might not be needed in many cases and is therefore listed as optional. The share
of cryptographic operations on the estimated costs of a warm reboot to pro-
tected mode is 88%. Clearing confidential data is constituting the main part of
the costs when soft rebooting into normal mode. We believe that the soft re-
boot performance is more than reasonable in settings where a hypervisor is only
needed sporadicly. Assuming the estimations from above and a hypervisor over-
head of at least 2%, an execution phase of 1 second in which secure services are
not required is already enough to make a temporarily deactivation of service and
hypervisor through a soft reboot profitable. As the soft reset, different from a full
reset, keeps all volatile memory content, soft reboots are also considerably faster
than cold reboots with full resets. In order to achieve the same functionality
of enabling and disabling virtualization on demand with full resets, additional
costs to the ones listed above would arise, for example for storing application
data before rebooting.
5.2 Security
Attacker Model We assume that the attacker has full control over the com-
modity OS. However, the hypervisor is supposed to be free from vulnerabilities,
which can be assured by formal verification. Furthermore, we trust CPU, MMU
and BIOS. Hardware attacks are out of scope of this paper. Devices are assumed
to reset whenever a reset signal is issued.6 In particular, no previously pend-
ing DMA operations will be performed after the reset until DMA controllers
are reprogrammed. We furthermore assume that the hypervisor is aware of the
specification of all present DMA devices, so it can intercept accordingly, and
that the devices’ behavior actually follows their (non-hostile) specifications. Al-
ternatively, an IOMMU can be used to protect against DMA attacks.
We assume that the attacker aims at obtaining confidential data about the
trusted guest and/or to affect its execution outside of the controlled communi-
cation channel provided. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are out of scope of this
paper, since a malicious commodity OS has the ability of shutting down the ma-
chine or otherwise introducing delays anyway. However, making the watch dog
timer aware of the mode state register as described in Section 2.1 improves the
protection against DoS attacks, even though complete protection is not achieved
by this enhancement either.
Protection in Different Execution Phases In the following, we discuss the
different aspects of the system’s security in detail.
Execution in Normal Mode When in normal mode, the trusted guest and con-
fidential parts of the hypervisor are stored in encrypted form. Access to the
corresponding chip unique key(s) is rejected.
Entering Protected Mode The system can only enter protected mode along with
the execution of a trusted and unmodifiable bootcode. In order to change the
mode register, it needs to be unlocked. It is guaranteed by hardware that this
unlocking is performed together with a CPU reset. The reset sets the program
counter to a fixed address pointing to the bootcode in ROM. On ARM processors,
neither this address nor the endianess or the instruction set used after reset can
be changed by the commodity OS, even when running in privileged mode, since
the values for those system parameters are copied from the System Control
Register (SCTLR) register of coprocessor 15 which in turn is set back to default
values first on reset [2, pp. B1-1202, B1-1203]. In particular, the MMU is disabled
6 For functionality, the operating system or hypervisor respectively needs to wait until
devices have finished pending tasks before issuing a reset signal. However, the specific
time of a reset has no effect on the security.
[2, p. B3-1308], so that the used entrance point of the exception vector table can
not be translated to a different address. Standard interrupts are masked by the
reset and not unmasked before control has been transferred to the hypervisor.
Fast interrupts are disabled by the boot code, even though there are no devices
tied to fast interrupts in our setting. The remaining bits of the Current Processor
State Register (CPSR) are set to default values by the boot code. If the integrity
verification of either hypervisor or trusted guest fails, the memory is cleared and
a reset to normal mode is enforced, so that compromised software will never be
executed.
Execution in Protected Mode The hypervisor is the first software invoked by
the boot code. It configures the system’s memory protection in such a way that
the hypervisor code and data, the trusted domain, the transition crypto module,
chip unique keys and register extensions are inaccessible to guests. All exceptions
are mapped to handlers under the control of the hypervisor.
Leaving Protected Mode In order for the commodity OS to (re-)gain privileged
rights, a reset has to be issued, since the hypervisor is maintaining control over
the system in all other cases. From a functional perspective, this is ideally done
through the hypervisor by sending an unlock request to the mode register. How-
ever, from a security point of view we have to assume that the attacker can
establish a reset signal at any arbitrary time. In case this happens when the
transition register is (still) set to protected, the system will either get back to a
state where the hypervisor is in charge or (if integrity verification fails) all data
will be erased and the mode changed to normal before booting the commodity
OS. Even achieving one or several more reset signals during the soft reboot pro-
cess will not be of any benefit to the attacker since she has no possibility to set
the transition register to normal during that phase. In the other case that the
transition register is set to normal before reset, the system has either been in
normal mode anyway (and confidential data is not present) or the hypervisor has
already erased all confidential data (as required by the protocol before setting
the transition register back to normal). The MMU is preventing unprivileged
access to the transition register. Multiple randomized overwriting of confidential
memory regions can be used instead of single overwriting, if deleted information
must to not be retrievable in hardware forensics. Before handing over execution
to the commodity OS, the boot code clears all registers to avoid that confidential
data from a protected mode phase is leaked to normal mode.
Further Aspects
DMA Devices In normal mode, devices do not have any more privileges than
the commodity OS. In protected mode, the hypervisor is able to intercept all at-
tempts to program DMA devices or can configure an IOMMU to protect security
critical parts of the memory. On soft reboot, pending DMA tasks are canceled.
In particular, the only DMA operations performed during the booting phase are
those executed with respect to the (trusted) transition crypto module.
Proof of Mode A design assumption of our solution was that the fact that the
system is running in protected mode will be proven to the user by functionality.
For many common applications (e.g., for secret key services such as signing) it
is impossible for the attacker to make the user believe the trusted application
was active if it was actually not. However, alternative embodiments are possible
where a secret is displayed to the user or a LED is tied to the mode register.
6 Related Work
In [18] IBM describes a method for directing the system’s reset signal to a specific
partition in a virtualized setting. The method is therefore another suggestion on
how to make use of reset functionality in virtualized environments, but does not
address virtualization overhead.
Instead of disabling virtualization completely when it is not needed, a natu-
ral first step is to reduce its costs to a minimum. For example, in specific I/O
operations hypervisors can be bypassed [20]. However, this requires hardware
support and applies only to a subset of all (I/O) operations. Naughton et al.
[23] discuss approaches to extend the Xen hypervisor dynamically by loading
additional modules on runtime. In that way, the usage of space and other re-
sources can be optimized. Still, a basic instance of Xen would always be active,
something we avoid in our solution.
How to turn off a hypervisor while keeping other software running has been
demonstrated for a machine with a dedicated processor mode for virtualization
[14]. However, in many embedded architectures - for example on the common
ARMv7-processor - the additional requirement of lifting the operating system
to the privileged ring needs to be accomplished as well. Furthermore, the soft
reboot approach described in the present paper allows turning on the hypervisor
(again), guaranteeing the integrity protection of both the booted hypervisor and
additional guests while the hypervisor is off.
The separation facilities provided by TrustZone (see Section 2.1) can be used
to execute trusted services isolated without suffering from the performance over-
head introduced by virtualization and without the need of paravirtualizing the
commodity OS. At the same time, other CPUs on the system stay unaffected,
which can be seen as additional advantage over the soft reboot approach, which
requires all CPUs to agree on the mode. However, even if considering a system
with a CPU already supporting TrustZone (which is not given for many em-
bedded processors, such as CPUs with ARMv5 architecture), using TrustZone
to execute software isolated requires from the SoC that peripherals are adapted
in order to respect the extended address format and thus maintain separation
between the two worlds. In contrast, the solution presented in this paper requires
only minor additions to the SoC. If the execution of several isolated services or
a symmetric protection between service(s) and commodity OS is required in a
TrustZone solution, the secure world will need to run a separation kernel, as
used in the proposed soft reboot solution as well. Note that TrustZone based ap-
proaches still need to make sure that trusted services are kept confidential before
being loaded from external storage to the secure world. To achieve this, further
hardware extensions are required in order to provide a secure boot scheme.
An alternative way to securely invoke a hypervisor at an arbitrary point
of time is provided by trusted computing technology [30]. Similar to our so-
lution, trusted guests (and hypervisor) would be kept encrypted and integrity
protected until a cryptographic hardware module (in that case the Trusted Plat-
form Module (TPM)) decrypts and verifies them. However, in this method called
sealed storage, the collaboration of the decrypting module does not depend on a
mode, but on binaries loaded to the system. Applying the late launch technology,
as available for modern Intel and AMD processors, this check ignores already
loaded software and instead ensures that a dedicated secure load block (SLB) is
executed. Only a loaded and unmodifed SLB will enable the decryption of the
sealed data [17,1,22]. This principle is comparable to the entanglement of the
mode register’s unlocking and the reset that enforces the execution of the first
stage boot code in our approach. However, not only is the technology not avail-
able for embedded systems, it has also been demonstrated that late launch can
be circumvented and hypervisors can be modified by malicious code injected to
the system before the late launch [31,25]. Even if this attack cannot be applied to
all architectures and the vulnerability might be fixed in the future, it gives rea-
son to doubt that TPM-based solutions provide a holistic principle covering the
entire system. Furthermore, TPM-operations are comparatively expensive, due
to a slow bus connection and relatively slow asymmetric decryption algorithms.
A proper (and still simple) mode aware cryptographic module (with DMA sup-
port), which we suggest for our approach, is more efficient and cost-effective and
does not require any modifications to the CPU.
Making use of the same enablers (sealed storage and late launch), the Flicker
environment [22] focuses on the isolated execution of single trusted applications
instead of the delayed activation of a hypervisor. This decision against virtu-
alization certainly decreases the trusted computing base even more, but comes
with the drawback that the commodity operating system has to be paused while
the trusted application is being executed and that only one trusted service can
be active at a time. A similar functionality to the one of Flicker can be achieved
with the hardware extensions that we propose. However, the feature of remote
attestation is naturally reserved to platforms with trusted computing support.
Furthermore, [22] admittedly provides a stronger protection against replay at-
tacks even without further hardware extension.
SICE [6] makes use of x86’s System Management Mode (SMM) to provide an
asymmetric isolation between commodity OS and isolated software, based on a
TCB including only the hardware, the BIOS and the SMM with a software foun-
dation of 300 LoC (excluding cryptographic libraries). However, isolated software
can not access peripherals directly and - as the authors point out themselves -
since the SMM was not designed with security in mind and several attacks on
it are already known, careful security reviews are necessary before deployment.
While still seeming to be a promising approach for asymmetric isolation on x86
systems, SICE’s principle is not applicable to embedded systems.
7 Conclusion
We have presented a dual mode approach to turn the system’s hypervisor on
and off on demand. Integrity and privacy of trusted guests are maintained at all
times: while virtualization is active (in protected mode), while it is not (in normal
mode), and while the machine is powered off. The solution requires only minor
additions to an existing SoC design, namely two new registers and hardware
protected keys. Hardware support for the cryptographic operations guarantees
efficiency. No extensions to the CPU or adaption of other devices are needed. The
performance measurements of a prototype implementation in emulated hardware
show that soft reboots can provide benefits in several scenarios for embedded
systems. In particular, the efficiency is higher than when performing a cold re-
boot or maintaining virtualization while not needed. The main costs for enabling
isolated services consists of their decryption and the integrity check of those ser-
vices and of the lightweight hypervisor. Returning to non-virtualized execution
does not take much longer than the erasure of newly produced confidential data.
Furthermore, paravirtualization is not necessary in settings where the commod-
ity OS can be paused while in protected mode. We leave the formal verification
of our approach as possible future work.
8 Acknowledgements
Work supported by framework grant “IT 2010” from the Swedish Foundation
for Strategic Research.
References
1. AMD: AMD64 virtualization: Secure virtualization: Secure virtual machine archi-
tecture reference manual. AMD Publication number 33047, revision 3.01 (2005)
2. ARM: ARMv7-A architecture reference manual, issue C. http://infocenter.arm.
com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.ddi0406c
3. ARM: Integrator baseboards. http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.
arm.doc.subset.boards.integratorbaseboards
4. ARM: TrustZone Technology. http://www.arm.com/products/processors/
technologies/trustzone.php/
5. ARM Technical Support Knowledge Articles: What is the fastest way to copy
memory on a Cortex-A8? http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=
/com.arm.doc.faqs/ka13544.html (2011)
6. Azab, A.M., Ning, P., Zhang, X.: SICE: a hardware-level strongly isolated com-
puting environment for x86 multi-core platforms. In: Proceedings of the 18th ACM
conference on Computer and communications security. pp. 375–388. ACM (2011)
7. BeagleBoard.org Foundation: BeagleBoard product page. http://beagleboard.
org/Products/BeagleBoard
8. BeagleBoard.org Foundation: BeagleBoard-xM product page. http:
//beagleboard.org/Products/BeagleBoard-xM
9. BeagleBoard.org Foundation: BeagleBone product page. http://beagleboard.
org/Products/BeagleBone
10. Chaves, R., Kuzmanov, G., Sousa, L., Vassiliadis, S.: Improving SHA-2 hardware
implementations. In: In Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded
Systems, CHES 2006 (2006)
11. Dam, M., Guanciale, R., Khakpour, N., Nemati, H., Schwarz, O.: Formal verifi-
cation of information flow security for a simple ARM-based separation kernel. In:
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security (CCS’13) (2013)
12. Ding, J.H., Lin, C.J., Chang, P.H., Tsang, C.H., Hsu, W.C., Chung, Y.C.: ARMvi-
sor: System virtualization for ARM. In: Linux Symposium (2012)
13. Douglas, H., Gehrmann, C.: Secure virtualization and multicore platforms state-
of-the-art report. Tech. Report. http://soda.swedish-ict.se/3800/ (2009)
14. Ga´briˇs, F.: Turning off hypervisor and resuming OS in 100 instructions. Presen-
tation at FASM CON 2009, Myjava, Slovak Republic, http://fdbg.x86asm.net/
Turning_off_hypervisor_and_resuming_OS_in_100_instructions.ppt
15. Goldberg, R.P.: Architectural principles of virtual machines. Ph.D. thesis, Harvard
University (1972)
16. Goldberg, R.P.: Survey of virtual machine research. IEEE Comp. Magazine (1974)
17. Grawrock, D.: The Intel safer computing initiative: Building blocks for trusted
computing (2006)
18. Harrington, B.R., Mehta, C., Milton, D.M.I., Perez, M.A., Randall, D.L.,
Willoughby, D.R.: System and method for selectively executing a reboot request
after a reset to power on state for a particular partition in a logically partitioned
system. US patent US 7146515 B2, http://www.google.com/patents/US7146515
19. Hwang, J.Y., Suh, S.B., Heo, S.K., Park, C.J., Ryu, J.M., Park, S.Y., Kim, C.R.:
Xen on ARM: System virtualization using Xen hypervisor for ARM-based secure
mobile phones. In: CCNC (2008)
20. Liu, J., Huang, W., Abali, B., Panda, D.K.: High performance VMM-bypass I/O in
virtual machines. In: Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX ’06 Annual
Technical Conference. pp. 3–3. ATEC ’06, USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA,
USA (2006)
21. Make Linux Software: Super fast boot of embedded Linux. http://www.
makelinux.com/emb/fastboot/omap
22. McCune, J.M., Parno, B.J., Perrig, A., Reiter, M.K., Isozaki, H.: Flicker: an execu-
tion infrastructure for TCB minimization. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 42, 315–328
(2008)
23. Naughton, T., Vallee, G., Scott, S.: Dynamic adaptation using Xen. In: System-
level Virtualization for High Performance Computing (HPCVirt) (2007)
24. Open Virtual Platforms: OVP website. http://www.ovpworld.org/
25. Schellekens, D.: Design and Analysis of Trusted Computing Platforms. Ph.D. the-
sis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (2012)
26. Shafi, Q.: Cyber physical systems security: A brief survey. In: Computational Sci-
ence and Its Applications (ICCSA). pp. 146–150 (2012)
27. SICS: SICS Thin Hypervisor (STH) source. https://bitbucket.org/sicssec/sth
28. Smith, J.E., Nair, R.: Virtual Machines: Versatile Platforms for Systems and Pro-
cesses. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, USA (2005)
29. Sony Mobile: NovaThor U8500 product page. http://developer.sonymobile.
com/knowledge-base/technologies/novethor-u8500/
30. Trusted Computing Group: PC client specific TPM interface specification. Version
1.2, Revision 1.0 (2005)
31. Wojtczuk, R., Rutkowska, J.: Attacking Intel trusted execution technology. Black
Hat DC (2009)
